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NAFTA's Investment Protections and the
Division of Authority for Land Use and
Environmental Controls
VIcK BEEN*
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' con-
tains various "investor protections," including a provision requir-
ing signatory governments to compensate property owners if the
government either expropriates property or takes "measure[s]
tantamount to . . . expropriation."2 That provision, known as
Chapter 11, recently was used to force Mexico to pay compensa-
tion to Metalclad, an American corporation that owned a hazard-
ous waste facility in the municipality of Guadalcazar, when local
and provincial environmental and land use controls prevented the
facility from operating.3 Similarly, the expropriation provisions of
Chapter 11 are now the centerpiece of a $1 billion claim by a Ca-
nadian corporation that California regulations requiring the
phase out of the gasoline additive MTBE effected a "regulatory
taking" by reducing the Canadian company's market for metha-
nol, a substance used to produce MTBE. 4
It is too early to judge just how broadly the arbitral panels
will interpret the expropriation provisions of Chapter 11, but
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I benefited enormously
from the helpful comments of Richard Briffault, Ricky Revesz, Carol Rose, the partici-
pants in NYU School of Law's Globalization and its Discontents Colloquium, partici-
pants in the Pace Law School's Symposium on the Advent of Local Environmental
Law, and students in NYU's Spring 2002 Advanced Environmental Law Seminar. I
also am indebted to Joel Beauvais, Erik Bluemel, Ashley Miller, Melissa Richman and
Gabriel Ross for invaluable research assistance and critical analysis. I gratefully ac-
knowledge the support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research
Fund at the New York University School of Law.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, pt. 1-3, 32 I.L.M.
289; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, pt. 4-8, 32 I.L.M. 605 [herein-
after NAFTA].
2. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641. NAFTA's Article 1110 is
discussed infra Section I. Its expropriation provision is roughly styled after the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "[Nior shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
3. See infra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 138-163 and accompanying text.
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Metalclad and pending NAFTA regulatory takings claims have
the potential to upset many aspects of land use and environmental
law. I've explored in another article the ways in which arbitral
interpretations of NAFTA's expropriation provisions may pres-
sure Congress and state legislatures, as well as state and federal
courts, to interpret the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause more
favorably for property owners. 5 Several scholars have noted the
effect the provisions may have in chilling regulators from adopting
environmental and land use measures. 6 In this Article, I examine
another implication of the provisions-the potential they have to
affect the allocation of authority for land use and environmental
regulation among the federal, state and local governments, as well
as their potential to shift the boundaries between environmental
and land use law.
My claim in this Article is a narrow one. I take no stand here
on whether the "takings" provisions in NAFTA and other investor
protection or free trade agreements are, on balance, wealth maxi-
mizing or desirable from some other normative perspective. 7 Nor
do I take a position on whether the existing allocation of authority
for land use and environmental regulation among federal, state,
and local governments is optimal.8 Instead, my goal is to high-
5. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA's In-
vestment Protections and The Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Tak-
ings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Environment: the Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209 (2001); David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Pro-
tection and Investor Rights under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,646 (June 2001); William Greider, The Right and U.S. Trade Law: Invali-
dating the 20th Century, THE NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 1.
7. But see Been, supra note 5.
8. For a flavor of the debate see, for example, Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R.
Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environ-
mental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 31 nn.19, 42-45 (1996)
(Symposium Issue); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 597-98 (1996);
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal
System-And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1236-37 (1995); Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism And Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115
HARv. L. REV. 553 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2341 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethink-
ing the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233- 44 (1992); Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Reply to Professor Revesz's




light the consequences investor protection provisions could have
for that allocation of authority, and thereby seek to ensure that
those consequences are taken into account in discussions about
the wisdom of including such protections in bilateral and multilat-
eral free trade or investment agreements.
The Article proceeds as follows: Section I provides a brief
sketch of the content and reach of investor protection provisions,
and of the investor-state dispute mechanism by which private in-
vestors can enforce the provisions. Section II reviews the arbitral
awards already rendered under NAFTA, as well as pending
claims. Section III analyzes how the federal government might
respond to awards by seeking to recoup damages from the state or
local government responsible for the regulation held to violate
NAFTA, and by seeking to dissuade state and local governments
from enacting regulations that might trigger NAFTA complaints.
Section IV then discusses the implications those federal responses
might have for the division of responsibility for land use and envi-
ronmental law among the federal, state and local governments,
and between land use and environmental regulators. Section V
addresses how those implications might be considered in current
debates about new investor protection agreements.
I. Overview of Investor Protection Provisions in Bi- and
Multi-Lateral Trade Agreements
NAFTA is just one component of a vast network of more than
1500 bilateral 9 (BITs) and multi-lateral agreements 10 that have
come into force over the past few decades. More than 160 nations
have entered into such agreements, including many transitional
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 295 (1998); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But
Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 285-86 (1997); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regula-
tion and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058-59 (1993); Richard
B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experi-
ence, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1343-44 (1992); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity
and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdic-
tions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 101 (1996) (Symposium
Issue); Stephen Williams, Panel IV: Culpability, Restitution, and the Environment:
The Vitality of Common Law Rules, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 560-61 (1994).
9. Daniel M. Price, The Management and Resolution of Cross Border Disputes as
Canada/U.S. Enter the 21st Century: Chapter 11-Private Party vs. Government, In-
vestor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107,
(2000). "[Flrom the vantage point of the year 2000, . . . more than 1500 bilateral
investment treaties [have been signed]. Most of them have provisions nearly identical
to those . . . [found] in NAFTA Chapter 11, including the feature of investor-state
dispute settlement." Id. at 107-08.
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economies and developing countries.' Although this Article fo-
cuses on NAFTA, many of the investor protections NAFTA con-
tains are also found in other bilateral and multi-lateral
agreements.
The expropriation provisions of NAFTA's Chapter 1112 re-
quire that:
[nio Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or
take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation
of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a nondiscriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1) [providing for minimum international stan-
dards of treatment, including fair and equitable treat-
ment]; and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with
paragraphs two through six [which require compensa-
10. In addition to NAFTA see, for example, European Energy Charter Confer-
ence: Final Act, Energy Charter Treaty, Decisions and Energy Charter Protocol on
Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360.
11. UNCTAD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN OVER-
VIEW 33-34 (1999) (stating more than 1700 treaties at the end of 1998, and only 45% of
those concluded in 1998 were between developed countries); see also Kenneth J. Van-
develde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
621, 621 (1998). "The massive and sudden proliferation of bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs), now constituting a network of more than 1300 agreements." Id.
12. For discussions of how NAFTA's investor protection provisions compare with
those of other bilateral and multilateral agreements, see UNCTAD, supra note 11, at
44-46; Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: an Examination of
the Evolution and Significance of the U. S. Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1983); Richard G. Dearden, Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes Between an
Investor and the State under the North American Free Trade Agreement, J. WORLD
TRADE, Feb. 1995, at 119-20 (considering the "tantamount to expropriation" language
an expansion of traditional doctrine); Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien
Property, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 41 (1986); Price, supra note 9, at
111-13; Ignaz Seidl-Hoheveldern, Semantics of Wealth Deprivation and Their Legal
Significance, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC ORDER 218, 238 (Detlev C. Dicke ed., 1987); Thomas Walde, Treaties and Regu-
latory Risk in Infrastructure Investment, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 15-22 (2000).
For the texts of various existing and proposed multi-lateral agreements see En-
ergy Charter Treaty, supra note 10, at 391; Free Trade Agreement of the Americas,
Draft Agreement (July 3, 2001), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft/eng/
ngin-e.doc; Multilateral Investment Agreement, Draft Consolidated Text (Apr. 22,
1998), available at http://wwwl.voecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987rle.pdf. For texts of
other bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party, see http://www.state.
gov/www/issues/economic/7treaty.html (last visited June 11, 2002) (collecting BIT
texts).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/3
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tion at fair market value, to be paid without delay,
with interest]. 13
NAFTA mandates that all four requirements must be met: the
fact that a measure is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory police
power regulation does not exempt the government from the obliga-
tion to compensate investors for harm to their property interests.
The investor protection provisions of typical BITs contain sev-
eral other elements that are important to understanding the lim-
its NAFTA may impose on land use and environmental
regulations. The following subsections explore those provisions.
A. The Investor Protections
The investor protections, called "disciplines," begin with two
requirements akin to the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses. Article 1102, entitled "Na-
tional Treatment," requires signatory governments to treat for-
eign investors "no less favorabl[y]" than they treat domestic
investors "in like circumstances."1 4 Article 1103, entitled "Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment," requires signatory governments to
treat foreign investors no less favorably than they treat other for-
eign investors of either parties or nonparties in like circum-
stances. 15 For example, if one of the parties has entered into an
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110, at 641-42.
14. Article 1102 states:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.
3. The treatment accorded by a party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means,
with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the
most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state or
province to investors, and to investments of investors, of the party of
which it forms a part.
Id. art. 1102, at 639.
15. Article 1103 states:
1. Each party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any
other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other dispo-
sition of investments.
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agreement with another nonparty country and has given that
country's investors advantages over the investors of its NAFTA
partners, the investors of the NAFTA parties become entitled to
those advantages as well. A party must accord foreign investors
the better of "national treatment" and "most-favored-nation
treatment."16
NAFTA and many BITs also contain a form of due process
guaranty: Article 1105 of NAFTA requires signatory parties to
"accord to investments of investors of another party treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security."' 7 The minimum stan-
dard of treatment requirement is not tied to a state's domestic
law; even if a state denies its own citizens and investors fair treat-
ment, it may not deny such treatment to foreign investors. Fi-
nally, NAFTA's Article 1106 prohibits conditioning foreign
investors' rights on performance requirements (such as mandates
that the foreign investment have a certain percentage of domestic
ownership or control, or that it incorporate a specified percentage
of domestic goods or domestic labor in its production processes).' 8
B. The Broad Reach of the Investor Protections
NAFTA's investor protections apply to "measures adopted or
maintained by a party relating to ... investors of another party;
[and] investments of investors of another Party in the territory of
2. Each party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments of investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, oper-
ation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
Id. art. 1103, at 639. For discussion about the overlooked importance of the national
treatment and most-favored-nation provisions of Chapter 11 see Joel C. Beauvais,
Note, Regulatory Expropriations under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering
Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245 (2002).
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1104, at 639.
17. Id. art. 1105, at 639-40.
18. Article 1106, entitled "Performance Requirements," states:
1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, or
enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the estab-
lishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an
investment of an investor of a party or of a non-Party in its territory:
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or ser-
vices provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services
from persons in its territory .
Id. art. 1106, at 640.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/3
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the Party .. .."19 "Measure," in turn, is defined as including "any
law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice."20 Although
some of the disciplines in Chapter 11 do not apply to nonconform-
ing laws and regulations in effect when NAFTA went into force,
the expropriation provisions apply even to preexisting measures. 21
"Investment" is very broadly defined to include any "real es-
tate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the ex-
pectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other
business purposes. '22 It also includes any enterprise (defined as a
corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture
or other association or entity organized under applicable law),23
equity or debt security of an enterprise, loan to an enterprise, or
interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to a share in in-
come or profits, or a share in the assets upon dissolution. Finally,
it includes any "interests arising from the commitment of capital
or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity
in such territory" such as construction or concession contracts.24
The definition contained in NAFTA is capacious; indeed, one critic
asserts that, "it is foreseeable . . . that minimal foreign invest-
ments may fund full challenges to environmental measures. For
example, a foreign component might be strategically added to an
otherwise domestic investment simply to have access to the ex-
traordinary rights and remedies found in Chapter 11."25
C. The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism
Chapter 11 establishes an "investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism" (ISDM) whereby individual investors may initiate
19. Id. art.1101(l), at 639.
20. Id. art. 201, at 298.
21. Article 1108 provides that Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107 do not apply to:
(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by
(i) a Party at the federal level, as set out in its Schedule to Annex I or
III,
(ii) a state or province, for two years after the date of entry into force
of this Agreement, and thereafter as set out by a Party in its
Schedule to Annex I in accordance with paragraph 2, or
(iii) a local government....
Id. art. 1108, at 640-41.
22. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139, at 647-48.
23. Id. art. 201(1), at 298.
24. Id. art. 1139, at 647-48.
25. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND TlIE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING
THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 24 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf (last visited April 25, 2003).
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claims against the host government without the acquiescence or
participation of the investor's government. 26 Although investor-
state mechanisms had been provided in some BITs, the scope of
the investor-state mechanism in Chapter 11 is path breaking for a
regional or multi-lateral trade or investment agreement.27 In-
deed, prior to NAFTA, "direct litigation between persons and
States was a rarity. '28
NAFTA's ISDM provisions require that disputes be submitted
to arbitration. 29 The arbitral tribunals are composed of three
members: one chosen by the investor; one by the host state; and a
third presiding member selected by agreement of the disputing
parties 30 or, if the parties are unable to agree, by the Secretary
26. Article 2103(6) specifically subjects general measures of taxation to the provi-
sions on expropriation, but requires that complaints about tax measures be dismissed
if the tax authorities of both countries decide within six months of the filing that the
tax did not amount to an expropriation. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103(6), at 700.
27. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 25, at 12.
28. Lawrence Herman, Sovereignty Revisited: Settlement of International Trade
Disputes-Challenges to Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121,
132 (1998). Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides a state-to-state dispute settlement mecha-
nism, but only one state-to-state arbitration has involved Chapter l1's investment
protections. See In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mex. v. U.S.), USA-
Mex-98-2008-01 (2001), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/nafta/english/
U98081ae.asp.
29. NAFTA Article 1120 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration) requires that in-
vestors of a signatory government submit claims against another signatory govern-
ment under one of three specified investor-state dispute mechanisms (ISDMs).
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120, at 643. The first, the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention (ICSID), is available only if the dis-
pute is between a state that is a party to the Convention and a complaining investor
that is a national of another party to the Convention. Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,
art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. Although the United States is a party,
Canada and Mexico currently are not, so NAFTA claims may not be brought under
the Convention. See List of Contracting Parties, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
constate/constate.htm (last visited June 6, 2002). For a discussion of ICSID see Mal-
colm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of De-
veloping Counties: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103 (1992).
The second, the ICSID Additional Facility, is available only if either the disputing
party or the party of the investor, but not both, are parties to the ICSID Convention.
ICSID, Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings
by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
art. 2, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/3.htm (last visited June 6,
2002).
The third is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL). See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-
glish/texts/arbitration/arb-rules.htm (last visited June 1, 2002).
30. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1123, at 644.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/3
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General of the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes. 31
To take advantage of the ISDM, an investor must consent to
the arbitral panel's jurisdiction and waive the right to pursue
claims for money damages before any administrative tribunal or
court of law.32 Arbitral awards may be enforced under the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention, or the Inter-American
Convention,33 under which they are to be treated as equivalent to
a final judgment in the court of the state party in which they are
enforced. There is no appeal mechanism, unlike in domestic
courts and other trade-related dispute resolution bodies such as
the World Trade Organization. 34 Nor is there any requirement
that the proceedings be open to the public.3 5 Canada, the United
States and Mexico recently agreed to make available to the public
all documents submitted to, or issued by a Chapter 11 tribunal,
which will be redacted to keep secret any confidential business in-
formation.36 In addition, one of the arbitral panels recently ruled
that non-governmental environmental organizations could file
amicus briefs in Chapter 11 proceedings.37 The right is discretion-
ary with each individual tribunal; however, NGOs are not guaran-
teed a right to participate. 38
31. Id. art. 1124, at 644.
32. Id. art. 1121, at 643. Investors may pursue an injunction, or declaratory re-
lief, or extraordinary relief such as mandamus in parallel domestic proceedings. Id.
33. Id. art. 1136(6), at 646.
34. See Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBask, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA:
Building on the US-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 51 (1993). For
the right to appeal WTO rulings see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2 - Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1225, available at http://www.
wto.org/englishl/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm#Top; see also Robert E. Hudec, The New
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 2 (1999).
35. HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT &
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA's
CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS 11 (2001), available at http://www.iisd.
org/pdf/trade-citizensguide.pdf.
36. See NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN
CHAPTER 11 PROVISIONS (2001), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-in-
terpr-en.asp.
37. Methanex Corp. v. United States (Mex. v. U.S.), Decision on Authority to Ac-
cept Amicus Submissions (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
38. MANN, supra note 35, at 45; cf. Sierra Club & Greenpeace to Intervene in At-
torney General v. S.D. Myers (Can. v. U.S.), 2001 F.C.T. 317, available at http://deci-
sions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct2001/2001fct317.html, affd, 2002 F.C.A. 39, available at http://
decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca39.html (last visited June 10, 2002) (denying
leave for environmental groups to intervene in the proceedings involving S.D. Myers).
2002]
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II. Arbitral Interpretations of "Takings" Protections
Four arbitral awards have been issued on the merits in
NAFTA disputes in which investors claimed that Article 1110's
"takings" provisions required compensation. 39 At least a dozen
other such claims are now pending before arbitral panels.40
Under NAFTA's Article 1136, the decision of any arbitral panel
"shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties
and in respect of the particular case."41 Nevertheless, the panels
in the four decided claims have referred to each other's holdings, 42
and in practice, arbitral awards are given deference by later
panels, even if they are not legally binding.43 The following sub-
sections briefly canvass the decisions and pending claims.
39. In addition, one tribunal dismissed an expropriation claim as time-barred.
See Award 60-62, at 75, Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organ-
ization/14442.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003). At least one claim filed under NAFTA's
Chapter 11, Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999), was settled before the arbi-
tral panel reached a decision on the merits. For discussions of Ethyl see Julie A.
Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives
Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 56 (1999); Timothy Ross Wilson, Trade
Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter 11)-Part I: Claim and Award
on Jurisdiction, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 52 (2000); Timothy R. Wilson, Trade
Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter 11)-Part II: Are Fears
Founded?, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. Am. 205 (2000). For contrasting views about
whether the settlement was driven by the investor protection provisions of NAFTA
see, for example, Sanford E. Gaines, Triangulating Sustainable Development: Inter-
national Trade, Environmental Protection, and Development, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,318 (Mar. 2002).
At least three other claims under Chapter 11 were filed and made public, but
were either settled or abandoned. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitra-
tion, Ketcham Investments, Inc. and Tysa Investments, Inv. v. Canada (Dec. 22,
2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nacdocuments/K%26T-e.pdf; No-
tice of Claim and Demand for Arbitration, Sun Belt, Inc. v. Canada (Oct. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.cyberus.ca/-tweiler/sun_02.pdf; Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration, Trammel Crow Co. v. Canada (Sept. 7, 2001), available at http:ll
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/TC-vs-GC.pdf.
40. Because the arbitrations and the arbitral awards are not required to be pub-
lic, there may be other awards or other pending cases. The most complete listing of
both awards and pending arbitrations is maintained by Todd Weiler, Naftalaw.org, at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Apr. 12, 2003).
41. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136, at 646.
42. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (decision in S.D. Myers citing deci-
sion in Pope & Talbot).
43. See Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/
2, 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 214, 241 (June 2, 2000) (dissenting opin-
ion) (explaining the need to write a separate dissent because the "precedential signifi-
cance of this award for future proceedings ... cannot be underestimated."), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/wastediss.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003);




1. Robert Azinian et al (DESONA de C.V.) v. Mexico
The first decision under NAFTA's Chapter 11, indeed the first
decision in any investor-to-state dispute regarding the investor
protections of a multi-lateral investment agreement, 44 rejected a
claim that the City of Naucalpan had to pay compensation for can-
celing a contract for the collection and treatment of the City's solid
waste.45 The City approved a fifteen-year concession to DESONA
for an "integrated solution" to the City's solid waste problems that
called for, among other things, an investment of U.S. $20 million
and the construction of a 200-megawatt plant to convert gases
from the decomposition of trash to electricity.46 DESONA, a Mexi-
can corporation whose shareholders were Americans, began oper-
ations by collecting trash with two reconditioned garbage trucks,
rather than the seventy "state-of-the-art" vehicles called for under
the concession contract. 47 Concerned about DESONA's perform-
ance of the contract, the Naucalpan City Council sought legal ad-
vice, and then asked DESONA to respond to the legal counsel's
determination that there were twenty-seven irregularities in the
procurement and implementation of the contract.48 DESONA in-
stead challenged that request in an action before Mexico's State
Administrative Tribunal. 49 The City then canceled the concession
contract, asserting that the concession was either void due to mis-
representations or rescindable for failure of performance. The Ad-
ministrative Tribunal upheld the City's right to cancel the
contract, and on appeal, the Superior Chamber of the Administra-
tive Tribunal affirmed the decision, holding that the City had
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 735 (1993); see gener-
ally Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One
of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De
Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 1 (1999); Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National
Systems: the Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).
44. Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note to Azinian v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/awards.htm.
45. Id.
46. Award TI 27, at 6, Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robert_
award.pdf.
47. Id. 33, at 8.
48. Id. 13, at 3.
49. Id. T 16, at 4.
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proved nine irregularities that were legal bases for annulling the
concession. 50 The Federal Circuit Court affirmed that decision. 51
DESONA's American shareholders then instituted arbitral pro-
ceedings under NAFTA, seeking up to U.S. $19.2 million for the
alleged expropriation of the value of the concession.5 2 In rejecting
the claim, the panel emphasized that the City's determination
that the contract was invalid had been upheld by the courts of
Mexico, and reasoned that a "governmental authority surely can-
not be faulted for acting in a manner validated by its courts unless
the courts themselves are disavowed at the international level,"53 in
other words, unless the court decisions themselves violated
NAFTA either by "a denial of justice, or a pretense of form to
achieve an internationally unlawful end."54 The investors had not
complained about the decisions of the Mexican courts, and "if
there is no complaint against a determination by a competent
court that a contract governed by Mexican law was invalid under
Mexican law, there is by definition no contract to be expropri-
ated."55 The panel opined, however, that the claimant's failure
was not simply one of pleading, and stated that it "views the evi-
dence as sufficient to dispel any shadow over the bona fides of the
Mexican judgments. Their findings cannot possibly be said to
have been arbitrary, let alone malicious." 56 Indeed, the Tribunal
stated that the evidence "positively supports the conclusions of the
Mexican courts."57
2. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada
In 1996, the United States and Canada entered into the Soft-
wood Lumber Agreement (SLA), which required Canada to limit
the quantity of softwood lumber exported from four of its prov-
50. Id. I 17, at 4.
51. Id. 23, at 4.
52. Award 75, at 20, Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robert
award.pdf.
53. Id. 95, at 27.
54. Award 91 99, at 29, Robert Azinian v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/2,, 14 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1 (Nov. 1, 1999) (em-
phasis in original), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robertaward.
pdf.
55. Id. 91 100, at 29.
56. Id. 91 103, at 29.




inces to the United States free of import duties. 58 Canada allo-
cated the quota imposed by that agreement among the four
provinces, and among individual producers within those prov-
inces.5 9 Pope & Talbot, Inc. is a U.S. corporation; its wholly
owned subsidiary owns a Canadian corporation, Pope & Talbot
Ltd., which manufactures and sells softwood lumber from facili-
ties in British Columbia. 60 Pope & Talbot, Inc. complained that
the share of the quota allocated to British Columbia disadvan-
taged that province relative to other provinces. 61 Further, Pope
and Talbot Ltd's individual quota allocation declined by 6.3% over
the first three years of the SLA.62
Pope & Talbot, Inc. therefore claimed that Canada's alloca-
tion of the quota violated Article 1102's national treatment re-
quirements, Article 1103's most-favored-nation treatment
requirements, Article 1105's minimum standards of treatment
provisions, Article 1106's prohibition against performance re-
quirements, and Article 1110's compensation requirements. 63
Pope & Talbot's statement of claim defined expropriation expan-
sively as "the act by which governmental authority is used to deny
some benefit of property to an investor[,]" 64 including "govern-
ment action that harms or delays the effective enjoyment of an
investment."65 It sought U.S. $80 million for the expropriation,
along with damages for violations of the other provisions of Chap-
ter 11, legal fees, interest and expenses incurred in opposing the
effect of Canada's implementation of the SLA.66
The arbitral panel rejected Pope & Talbot's Article 1110 claim
in June 2000.67 The Tribunal first agreed with Pope & Talbot that
"access to the U.S. market" is a "property interest" subject to pro-
tection under NAFTA. 68 Pope & Talbot conceded, however, that
58. Interim Award 91 6, at 2, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (June 6, 2000), at
http://www.appletonlaw.com.
59. Id.
60. Id. 91 28, at 6.
61. Id. 91 45, at 15.
62. Id. 1 2, at 2.
63. Id. 40-45, at 13-15.
64. Statement of Claim 1 89, at 24, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (1999), at http://
www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
65. Id. 91 90, at 24.
66. Id. at 29.
67. The panel also rejected Pope & Talbot's claim that Canada had imposed per-
formance requirements in violation of art. 1106. Interim Award 9191 69-80, at 24-27,
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (June 26, 2000), at http://www.appletonlaw.com.
68. Id. 91 96, at 33.
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the quota allocation measures did not constitute an interference
with those property interests substantial enough to constitute an
expropriation under customary international law.69 Pope & Tal-
bot's Article 1110 claim thus rested on the argument that Article
1110's inclusion of the phrase "measure tantamount to expropria-
tion" expanded NAFTA's protection beyond customary interna-
tional law. 70 The Tribunal rejected that argument: "tantamount"
means "equivalent," and "[siomething that is equivalent to some-
thing else cannot logically encompass more."71 But the Tribunal
also rejected Canada's attempt to except all regulatory measures
from the reach of Article 1110, stating that "a blanket exception
for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in inter-
national protections against expropriation." 72
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal relied heavily upon sec-
tion 712 of the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the U.S., which makes a state responsible for expropriation when
it "subjects alien property to taxation, regulation, or other action
that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes
with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien's prop-
erty. . ..."73 The Tribunal interpreted the Restatement as recogniz-
ing that whether a regulation effects an expropriation "may rest
on the degree of interference with the property interest,"74 "the
degree to which the government action deprives the investor of
effective control over the enterprise" and whether the regulation
makes it "impossible for the firm to operate at a profit."75 Apply-
ing those tests, the Tribunal found that the interference with Pope
& Talbot's property interest was not sufficiently substantial to
constitute expropriation under customary international law. The
Tribunal especially noted that the investor retained control over
its business, continued to export substantial quantities of soft-
wood and continued to make substantial profits on those
exports.76
69. Id. 91 94, 103, at 33, 37-38.
70. Id. 1 96, at 33-34.
71. Id. $ 104, at 38.
72. Id. 9 99, at 35.
73. Interim Award T 99, at 35, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (June 6, 2000), at
http://www.appletonlaw.com (quoting THIRD RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 712, cmt. (g)) (emphasis added by Tribunal).
74. Id. at 35 n.73.
75. Id. at 37 n.81.




In April 2001, the Tribunal rejected Pope & Talbot's claim
that it had not received the same treatment as domestic investors,
in violation of Article 1102.7 7 It did, however, accept one of Pope
& Talbot's claims that it had been denied fair and equitable treat-
ment in violation of Article 1105.78 In May 2002, the arbitral
panel awarded approximately U.S. $400,000 in damages to Pope
& Talbot, Inc. for its legal and accounting fees relating to the vio-
lation, but found no lost profits or other actual losses from the un-
fair treatment.7 9
3. S.D. Myers v. Canada
S.D. Myers, a U.S. corporation, owned a polychlorinated bi-
phenyl (PCB) 0 remediation facility in Tallmadge, Ohio, about 100
kilometers south of the U.S. and Canadian border. In 1980, the
United States banned the import and export of PCB waste. In
1989, Canada signed the Basel Convention, which prohibits both
the export and import of hazardous waste to and from states that
are not a party to the Convention, unless pursuant to bilateral or
other agreements with provisions at least as strict as those of the
Basel Convention. The Basel Convention also requires signatory
states to reduce the trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste
to the minimum level consistent with environmentally sound and
efficient management of waste. Accordingly, Canada adopted a
policy of destroying PCBs within Canadian borders to the maxi-
mum extent possible: its PCB Waste Export Regulations of 1990
banned the export of PCB waste to any country other than the
77. Award on the Merits of Phase 2 $ 104, at 46, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada
(Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.appletonlaw.com.
78. The Tribunal focused intensive scrutiny on what it called the "Verification re-
view episode" by which Canada's Softwood Lumber Division (SLD) reviewed Pope &
Talbot's claim that it had not received the quota allocation to which it was entitled,
after the investor had filed notice of its intent to arbitrate under NAFTA. Id. $% 171-
81, at 80-87. The Tribunal concluded that SLD's "imperious insistence on having its
[own] way," during the review, the "tenor and lack of forthrightness of its internal
communications," and the fact that "relations between the SLD and the Investment
during 1999 were more like combat than cooperative regulation," added up to a denial
of the fair treatment required by NAFTA. Id.
79. Award in Respect to Damages 81-88, at 36-40, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Ca-
nada (May 31, 2002), at http://www.appletonlaw.com/. Pope & Talbot had claimed
damages of U.S. $80 million. APPLETON & ASSOCIATES, BACKGROUNDER: NAFTA
AWARD, POPE & TALBOT, INC. AND CANADA 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.ap-
pletonlaw.com/.
80. Polychlorinated biphenyl, a chemical used primarily in electrical equipment,
is highly toxic and biodegrades in the environment very slowly. Partial Award 94,
at 16-17, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Nov. 13, 2000), at http://www.appletonlaw.com/.
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United States, and allowed export to the United States only with
prior approval of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).8' In practice, the only exports to the United States prior to
1997 were of PCB waste owned by U.S. government agencies oper-
ating in Canada.8 2
In the early 1990's, Myers decided to try to exploit the Cana-
dian market for PCB remediation, and accordingly incorporated a
Canadian affiliate.8 3 Through that affiliate, Myers began to mar-
ket its services to Canadian PCB holders. Because its Ohio facil-
ity was located much nearer to many of those sources than the
facility of its Canadian competitor, Myers was able to offer
remediation at a lower cost. Myers also began to lobby EPA, Envi-
ronment Canada (Canada's federal environmental protection
agency), and various politicians and public officials. In October
1995, Myers was successful in securing an "enforcement discre-
tion" from EPA, which essentially promised not to enforce the ban
on the import of PCBs from Canada against Myers and nine other
U.S. companies until the end of 1997.84
Canada reacted to EPA's action by issuing an Interim Order
in November 1995, and a Final Order in February 1996, banning
the export of PCBs.8 5 In 1997, however, Canada amended its reg-
ulations to open the border for PCB exports to the United States.
The border remained open for approximately five months, but was
closed again when U.S. courts overturned EPA's Import for Dispo-
sal Rule, which had replaced its enforcement discretion. 86
Myers claimed that Canada's Interim and Final Orders
prohibiting export to the United States violated NAFTA Article
1102's national treatment obligations by discriminating against
Myers; violated Article 1105's requirement of fair and equitable
treatment; imposed performance requirements in violation of Arti-
cle 1106 by effectively forcing it to dispose of PCB waste in Ca-
nada; and expropriated Myers' property without just
compensation, in violation of Article 1110.87
The Tribunal began its analysis of the claims by exploring the
intent behind Canada's Interim Order. It found that "there were
81. Id. I1 123-27, at 23-27.
82. Id. 9[ 114-27, at 21-27.
83. Id. 111, at 20.
84. Id. 118-19, at 21-22.
85. Id. IT 123-27, at 23-27.
86. Sierra Club v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997).





legitimate concerns" raised by the government's deliberations over
how to respond to EPA's enforcement discretion, including ques-
tions about whether EPA's action was legal; whether the exports
to the United States would violate the Basel Convention because
the United States was not a signatory party; whether the PCBs
would be disposed of in the United States safely; and whether
there was a viable Canadian PCB disposal industry in the event
that U.S. disposal became unavailable.88 Nevertheless, the Tribu-
nal found that Canada's policy "was shaped to a very great extent
by the desire and intent to protect and promote the market share
of enterprises that would carry out the destruction of PCBs in Ca-
nada and that were owned by Canadian nationals."8 9 The Tribu-
nal was convinced that the Canadian Minister of the Environment
was primarily concerned that "PCB waste should be disposed of
... in Canada by Canadians," as she told officers of Canadian haz-
ardous waste facilities who met with her to lobby for an export
ban, and as she announced in the House of Commons in 1995.90
The Tribunal cited substantial evidence in the record that a wide
range of officials in the Department of the Environment and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had rec-
ommended that the border be opened for export of PCBs and had
advised that an Interim Order closing the border would violate
NAFTA. 91 The Minister's decision nevertheless to forbid exports
was
intended to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from
U.S. competition ... [Tihere was no legitimate environmental
reason for introducing the ban. Insofar as there was an indirect
environmental objective-to keep Canadian industry strong in
order to assure a continued disposal capability-it could have
been achieved by other measures. 92
The Tribunal then determined that the protectionist intent,
coupled with the "adverse effect on the non-national complainant,"
constituted a violation of the national treatment obligations of Ar-
ticle 1102. 93 The majority of the Tribunal also found that "on the
facts of this particular case the breach of Article 1102 essentially
88. Partial Award 9 121, at 22, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Nov. 13, 2000), at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/.
89. Id. 162, at 35.
90. Id. 911 169, 171, at 37-8.
91. Id. 164-95, at 35-44.
92. Id. 194-95, at 44.
93. Id. T% 254-56, at 63-4.
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establishes a breach of Article 1105 as well."94 Finally, the Tribu-
nal rejected the expropriation claim.
The Tribunal first stated that international law does not gen-
erally treat regulations as expropriations, and accordingly, "regu-
latory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of
legitimate complaint under Article 1110... although the Tribunal
does not rule out that possibility. '95  It explained that
"[elxpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership
rights [and] regulations [to] a lesser interference" and that dis-
tinction "screens out most potential cases of complaints concern-
ing economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that
governments will be subject to claims as they go about their busi-
ness of managing public affairs."96 The Tribunal rejected Myers'
argument that the use of the phrase "tantamount to expropria-
tion" was meant to expand Article 1110 beyond the customary
meaning of expropriation under international law, agreeing with
the Pope & Talbot Tribunal that "tantamount" simply means
"equivalent. '97 After noting that Canada's closure of the border
was temporary, that Canada had realized no benefit from the
measure, and that no property or benefit was transferred directly
to others, the Tribunal held that the regulation was not an expro-
priation.98 The panel left unclear whether a permanent closure of
the border would have constituted an exception to its view that
regulations generally will not constitute expropriations. The At-
torney General of Canada's challenge to the Tribunal's rulings is
now pending in the Ontario Federal Court.99
94. Partial Award $[ 266, at 66, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Nov. 13, 2000), at
http://www.appletonlaw.com. Edward C. Chiasson, the arbitrator chosen by Canada,
disagreed with this ruling, believing that a violation of Article 1105 had to be based
upon a failure to meet the requirements of international law, not on the violation of
some other provision of NAFTA. Id. I 267, at 66-67.
95. Id. T 281, at 69.
96. Id. 91 282, at 69.
97. Id. 286, at 69-70.
98. Id. 287-88, at 70.
99. Notice of Application, In the Matter of Sections 5 and 6 of the Commercial
Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 C.17 (2d Supp.) & In the Matter of an Arbitration Under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement Between S.D. Myers and
the Canada, Attorney General v. S.D. Myers (Can. v. U.S.), Fed. Ct., Trial Div., Ot-
tawa, Ontario, T-255-01 (Feb. 8, 2001). In its challenge, the Attorney General asserts
that (1) the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in addressing issues not properly before
it, (2) misinterpreted NAFTA by finding that S.D. Myers was an "investor" and that
its subsidiary, S.D. Myers (Canada), was an "investment" and (3) misapplied




4. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico
Metalclad was the first decision, and to date the only decision,
to find a violation of NAFTA Article 1110's expropriation provi-
sions. COTERIN, a Mexican corporation, owned land about sev-
enty kilometers from Guadalcazar, Mexico, in the state of San
Luis Potosi (SLP). In 1990, the federal government of Mexico
granted a permit to COTERIN to construct and operate a hazard-
ous waste transfer station on the site. 100 About 20,000 tons of
waste were deposited at the site untreated, and in 1991, the fed-
eral government ordered the closure of the transfer station. 10 1
The same year, COTERIN applied for, and was denied, a munici-
pal permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill. 10 2 In 1993,
however, COTERIN secured permits to build a hazardous waste
landfill from the federal National Ecological Institute (NEI). 10 3
Shortly thereafter, Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, operating
through wholly owned U.S. and Mexican subsidiaries, contracted
for a six-month option to buy COTERIN and its permits. 10 4 The
option agreement was subject to the condition that COTERIN ob-
tain either a municipal building permit or a definitive judgment
from the Mexican courts that a building permit was not
necessary.10 5
SLP then issued a state land use permit to construct the land-
fill. Metalclad met with the governor of SLP and believed it had
obtained his support for the project. Metalclad also secured assur-
ances from the president of the NEI and the general director of the
Mexican Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology that all
the permits necessary for the landfill had been issued except for a
federal permit for operation of the landfill, and that the federal
government would obtain support for the project from Guadal-
cazar and SLP. 10 6 The missing federal permit was then issued,
100. Award, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf.
101. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp, [20011 89 B.C.L.R.3d 664, % 5,
available at http://courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/01/06/2001BCSC0664.htm; see also
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, [2001] 95 B.C.L.R.3d 169, (supple-
mental reasons for judgment), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb%2Dtxt/sc/
01/15/2001bcscl529.htm.
102. United Mexican States, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 9% 6, at 664.
103. Award 91 29, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 .
104. Id. 1 30.
105. United Mexican States, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 91 8, at 664.
106. Award 91 31-34, 80, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
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and Metalclad exercised its option to purchase COTERIN, the
landfill site, and the permits.10 7
Shortly after the purchase, the governor of SLP began to de-
nounce the landfill project. Metalclad then embarked upon nego-
tiations with SLP, and believing that it had secured SLP's
support, began construction.10 8 Approximately six months later,
in October 1994, however, Guadalcazar issued a stop work order
because Metalclad had not obtained a municipal building permit
for the construction.' 0 9 Metalclad complained to federal officials,
who again assured Metalclad that it had all the necessary permits
to construct and operate the landfill and that the municipality had
no basis for denying a construction permit. The federal officials
suggested, however, that Metalclad go through the motions of ap-
plying for the building permit in order to appease the municipal-
ity.110 Metalclad did apply for the permit and resumed
construction, completing the landfill in March 1995.11
The landfill's opening was impeded by demonstrations staged
by facility opponents. Further negotiations ensued, and in Novem-
ber 1995, Metalclad, NEI, and the Mexican Federal Attorney's Of-
fice for the Protection of the Environment entered into an
agreement that allowed the operation of the landfill in exchange
for Metalclad's agreement to remediate the previous contamina-
tion within the first three years of the landfill's operation and va-
rious concessions by Metalclad (such as the designation of a buffer
zone for the conservation of some species and a municipal tipping
fee). 1 2 In December 1995, however, Guadalcazar denied Metal-
clad's application for the building permit on four grounds: it had
earlier denied COTERIN's applications for such permits; Metal-
clad improperly began construction without a permit; the munici-
pality had environmental concerns about the landfill; and
Guadalcazar's residents opposed the grant of the permit. 113
Metalclad was neither given notice of, nor provided an opportu-
nity to participate in the meeting at which that decision was
made, and its application for reconsideration was denied. 1 4
107. Id. T 35.
108. Id. TT 37-39.
109. Id. 39.
110. Id. 11 41, 87-89.
111. Id. 45.
112. Award TT 45-48, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
113. United Mexican States, 89 B.C.L.R.3d T 13, at 664.




After attempts to negotiate a solution to the impasse failed,
Metalclad filed a claim under NAFTA, alleging that Mexico,
through its state and local governments, violated NAFTA's Article
1105, which requires parties to treat investments "in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security" 1 5. It also alleged violations of
the compensation requirements of Article 1110. Metalclad sought
approximately U.S. $90 million for the violations. 116 While the
claim was pending and just before he was to leave office, the gov-
ernor of SLP issued an ecological decree declaring a natural area
for the protection of rare cacti that encompassed the landfill site,
which had the effect of preventing operation of the landfill. 117
The Metalclad Tribunal found that Mexico had violated Arti-
cle 1105, which the Tribunal believed was intended to promote
"transparency," or the idea "that all relevant legal requirements
for the purposes of initiating, completing and successfully operat-
ing investments made, or intended to be made... should be capa-
ble of being readily known to all affected investors."" 8 Further,
the Tribunal held that if
the authorities of the central government of any Party ... be-
come aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in
this connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct posi-
tion is promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors
can proceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident be-
lief that they are acting in accordance with all relevant laws.119
The Tribunal reasoned that Metalclad was entitled to rely
upon the representations of the federal government that no local
construction permit was necessary, and that the municipality
would have no legal basis for denying the permit. 20 It held that
even if a municipal permit was required under Mexican law, the
municipality only had authority over matters related to physical
construction or defects in the site. 121 The impropriety of the mu-
nicipality's denial of the permit, coupled with Metalclad's reasona-
ble reliance on the federal government's representations and the
115. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105, at 639-40.
116. Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110: Can Regulation be Expropriation?, 5
NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 499, 501 (1999).
117. Award [ 58-59, 96, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
118. Id. 1 76.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. 1 86, at 25.
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"absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established
practice or procedure as to the manner of handling applications
for a municipal construction permit," amounted to a failure to "en-
sure a transparent and predictable framework" for investment in
violation of Article 1105(1).122
The Tribunal also found that Mexico's actions violated the ex-
propriation provision. That provision, the Tribunal stated,
prohibits:
not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property,
such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title
in favor of the host State, but also covert or incidental interfer-
ence with the use of property which has the effect of depriving
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasona-
bly-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not nec-
essarily to the obvious benefit of the host state. 123
Because the municipality acted outside its limited authority con-
cerning physical construction defects by denying the construction
permit in part for environmental reasons, and Metalclad reasona-
bly relied on the representations of the Mexican federal govern-
ment, Mexico "must be held to have taken a measure tantamount
to expropriation." 124
The Tribunal went on to find that the ecological decree issued
by the governor of SLP effectively "barr[ed] forever the operation
of the landfill" and therefore constituted an act tantamount to ex-
propriation. 125 It held that the compensation for the violation of
Article 1105 and for the expropriation would be the same because
both violations negated the possibility of any "meaningful" return
on Metalclad's investment. 126 The Tribunal awarded Metalclad
U.S. $16.7 million, Metalclad's investment in the project, plus in-
terest, and transferred title to the site to Mexico. 127
122. Id. IT 88, 101, at 25-27.
123. Award 1 103, at 28, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
124. The Tribunal based its decision, in part, upon the ruling in Biloune v. Ghana
Inv. Ctr., 95 I.L.R. 183, 207-10 (1993), which the Tribunal believed had found an indi-
rect expropriation in similar circumstances when a building permit was not issued.
Award 104 & 107, at 26 & 27, Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
125. Id. 911 109 & 112, at 30. The Tribunal noted that its finding regarding the
ecological decree was "not strictly necessary for its conclusion." Id. 109, at 30.
126. Id. 1 113, at 30.




Mexico challenged the award in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia. 128 That court found that the Tribunal's rulings as to
Article 1105 had to be set aside because the Tribunal had "mis-
stated the applicable law" to import a transparency obligation into
Article 1105.129 The Tribunal's finding that Mexico had violated
Article 1105 by failing to provide transparency therefore exceeded
the scope of the matters submitted to it for arbitration. 130 Be-
cause the Tribunal's finding that the denial of the building permit
had indirectly expropriated Metalclad's property was "infected" by
its erroneous view that Article 1105 included a transparency re-
quirement, that finding also had to be set aside as beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration. 1' 1 The Tribunal's finding
that SLP's ecological decree amounted to an expropriation was not
based upon the Tribunal's erroneous view that Article 1105 in-
cluded a transparency requirement, however, nor was the Tribu-
nal's finding patently unreasonable. 132 Although the court viewed
the Tribunal's definition of expropriation as "extremely broad,"
that definition was a question of law, and therefore, not review-
able by the court.133 Accordingly, the court upheld that portion of
the Tribunal's award finding the ecological decree to amount to an
expropriation as within the scope of the submission to
arbitration. 1
B. Pending Arbitrations
There are approximately one dozen NAFTA arbitrations cur-
rently pending 13 5 that also may result in arbitral interpretations
128. Because the parties had designated the place of arbitration to be Vancouver,
B.C., the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, allowed the Su-
preme Court of British Columbia to set aside the Tribunal's award in limited circum-
stances, including situations in which the "arbitral award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration." In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 233, pt. 7, § 34(2)(iv) (1996)
(Can.), available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/I/96233-O1.htm.
129. United Mexican States, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 70, at 664.
130. Id. 9 71-73, 76.
131. Id. 91 78-79.
132. Id. 94, 97, 99.
133. Id. T1 99.
134. Id. 105.
135. Arbitrations pending under BITs modeled after NAFTA also raise investor
protection claims. Technicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/02, filed in September 2000 by a Spanish investor
under a Spain-Mexico BIT, for example, appears to closely track the claims in Metal-
clad. MANN, supra note 35, at 52 n.54.
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of Article 1110's expropriation provisions. 136 The most important
pending claims, both in terms of their dollar value, and how
broadly they would expand the definition of expropriation if suc-
cessful, are discussed below.137
1. Methanex Corp. v. United States
Methanex, a Canadian corporation, indirectly owns a Texas
partnership, Methanex Methanol Co. (Methanex U.S.), which
manufactures and sells methanol, a substance used to produce
methyl-tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), among other things.13
MTBE is used in gasoline as a source of octane and as an oxygen-
ate. It was introduced in the late 1970s when various "environ-
mental and public health regulations requir[ed] a substantial
reduction in the use of lead in gasoline." 139 Its use became even
more widespread when the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act required higher oxygenates to be added to gasoline sold in cer-
tain metropolitan areas in the United States with severe ozone or
carbon monoxide levels, including southern California. 40 "EPA
has classified MTBE, a known animal carcinogen, as a possible
136. The text discusses only those pending arbitrations that raise expropriation
claims. For disputes raising other provisions of Chapter 11 see, for example, ADF
Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (July 11, 2001), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm (challenging a "Buy America"
clause in a contract with Virginia for the construction of its highways); Mann, supra
note 35, at 108-09.
137. In addition to the pending claims discussed in the text, notices of intent to
arbitrate under NAFTA that allege violations of Article 1110 include Marvin Roy
Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v. United Mexican States (refusing to rebate cigarette ex-
cise tax to exporters on the same basis as manufacturers allegedly had the effect of
closing Karpa's business and therefore constituted an expropriation) and Waste
Mgmt. v. United Mexican States (alleging expropriation arising from dispute over
cancellation of Waste Management's concession for street cleaning and other waste
related). Several claims, Doman Indus. Ltd. v. United States and Canfor Indus. Ltd.
v. United States, challenge duties the United States has imposed upon softwood lum-
ber imports. For descriptions of some of these claims see MANN, supra note 35, at 91-
92, 100, 105-06. For copies of the documents filed in the disputes that have been
made available to the public see http://www.naftalaw.org.
138. Draft Amended Claim at 3-4, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Feb. 12,
2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
139. Respondent's Statement of Defense $ 39, at 11, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Aug. 10, 2000), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/statement-of de-
fensefinal.pdf; see also Draft Amended Claim at 5-6, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Feb. 12, 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
140. Respondent's Statement of Defense $$ 39-40, at 11, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Aug. 10, 2000), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/statement-of de-
fense-final.pdf; see also Draft Amended Claim at 5-6, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Feb. 12, 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/3
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human carcinogen." 14 1 MTBE's pronounced taste and odor can
render water undrinkable even at very low concentrations. Be-
cause of its chemical properties, it contaminates more ground-
water, biodegrades more slowly, and is more difficult and
expensive to clean up than other ingredients of gasoline. 142
The market for MTBE in California "represents approxi-
mately 6% of the world demand for methanol."143 In 1997, the
California Senate funded a University of California (UC) study of
the human health and environmental risks of MTBE. 144 The UC
report concluded that there are significant risks and costs associ-
ated with MTBE contamination, and recommended that MTBE be
phased out of use in gasoline. 145 In March 1999, after studying
the report and responses from critics, Governor Gray Davis (D.)
concluded that "on balance, there is a significant risk to the envi-
ronment" from MTBE.146 The governor accordingly issued an ex-
ecutive order that directed the California Energy Commission
(CEC) to develop a timetable for removing MTBE from gasoline no
later than December 31, 2002, and directed various state agencies
to study the environmental and health risks of substituting etha-
nol for MTBE in gasoline. 47 The order also required the CEC to
evaluate what steps, if any, should be taken to promote the devel-
141. Respondent's Statement of Defense 51, at 11, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Aug. 10, 2000), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/statement of de-
fense final.pdf. But see Draft Amended Claim at 6-7, Methanex Corp'. v. United
States (Feb. 12, 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org (asserting that "most authorities do
not consider MTBE to be a carcinogen."); see also Julia Ferguson, California MTBE
Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental Interpretative
Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 499, 509 (2000).
142. Respondent's Statement of Defense IT 52-55, at 11, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Aug. 10, 2000), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/statement-of de-
fense.final.pdf.
143. Draft Amended Claim 91 36, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Feb. 12, 2001),
at http://www.naftalaw.org.
144. S. 521, 1997-1998 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), available at www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
97-98/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_521_bill_19971009_chaptered.pdf. The bill required
the governor to consider the report, peer-reviews of the report, and testimony at pub-
lic hearings to decide whether MTBE posed a significant health or environmental
risk, and if so, to take "appropriate action." Id. § 1.
145. Health & Environmental Assessment of MTBE, Report to the Governor and
Legislature of the State of California as Sponsored by S. 521, 1997-1998 Leg. Sess., at
11-14 (Cal. 1998), at http://tsrtp.ucdavis.edu/mtberpt.
146. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Announces Decision
Regarding MTBE (Mar. 25, 1999), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/gov-
site/govjhomepage.jsp.
147. Exec. Order No. D-5-99, 91 4 (Cal. 1999), available at http://www.governor.ca.
gov/state/govsite/govhomepage.jsp (last visited Oct. 30, 2002); see also Julia Fergu-
son, California Concerned about Contaminated Water: Canadian Corporation Files
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opment of ethanol in California if ethanol were found to be an ap-
propriate substitute for MTBE. 148 The relevant agencies
accordingly adopted regulations prohibiting the use of MTBE in
gasoline after December 31, 2002.149
In July 1999, after the issuance of the executive order but
before the implementing regulations were scheduled to go into ef-
fect, Methanex served notice of its intent to arbitrate a claim
under Article 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA. 150 Methanex claimed
that the order would have the effect of ending Methanex U.S.'s
business of selling methanol for use in MTBE in California, and
therefore, would expropriate its property. It also claimed that the
manner in which the California Senate and Governor Davis imple-
mented their bills and executive order violated Article 1105's re-
quirement of fair and equitable treatment. Methanex sought
damages of U.S. $970 million.
Methanex later amended its complaint to add an Article 1102
claim of discrimination. 15 1 That claim alleges that during his
1998 gubernatorial campaign, when the future of MTBE was
under review, then-candidate, Governor Davis accepted some
$160,000 in campaign contributions from the principal U.S. pro-
ducer of ethanol, the chief competitor of MTBE. 15 2 It further al-
leges that Governor Davis received another $50,000 in
NAFTA Expropriation Claim Against U. S., 1999 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 65
(2000).
148. Exec. Order No. D-5-99, $ 11 (Cal. 1999), available at http://www.governor.ca.
gov/state/govsite/gov.homepage.jsp (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). The Senate passed
Senate Bill 989, which reinforced the Executive Order by requiring the CEC to de-
velop a timetable for removing MTBE from gasoline as quickly as possible. S. 989,
1999 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
149. Respondent's Statement of Defense $ 84, at 11, Methanex Corp. v. United
States (Aug. 10, 2000), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/statement-of de-
fensefinal.pdf.
150. Notice of Intent to Submit A Claim To Arbitration Under Article 1119, Section
B, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Methanex Corp. v.
United States (July 2, 1999), at www.methanex.com/investorcentre/mtbe/notice-
ofintent.pdf. For other academic reviews of the Methanex challenge see Ferguson,
supra note 147, at 125; William T. Waren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex
v. United States and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10,986
(Aug. 2001).
151. Draft Amended Claim at 1, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Feb. 12, 2001),
at http://www.naftalaw.org. For discussion of the politics behind the move to substi-
tute ethanol for MTBE see Lizette Alvarez & David Barboza, Support Grows for Corn-
Based Fuel Despite Critics, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at Al.





contributions after he issued the executive order.153 Methanex as-
serts that because of the "U.S. ethanol industry's improper influ-
ence, the California measures were arbitrary, unreasonable,...
not in good faith ... and not the least trade-restrictive method of
solving the water contamination problem." 154 It cites as evidence
for its claim the fact that "European regulatory authorities, who
are not subject to any ethanol industry influence or pressure...
have concluded that MTBE is not a danger to the environment,
that it is not a carcinogen, and that there is no reason to ban its
use."'1 55 It alleges that California's actions on MTBE are the re-
sult of a "Baptist-bootlegger coalition" of the ethanol industry and
environmentalists that has led to discrimination against foreign
investors in the guise of environmental regulation. 156
The United States contested the panel's jurisdiction over the
claims, arguing, among other things, that the alleged damages
were too remote to provide a jurisdictional prerequisite, and that
neither a customer base nor a particular rate of profit is an "in-
vestment" that can be expropriated under Article 1110.157 The
Tribunal issued an award in August, 2002, holding that it had no
jurisdiction over Methanex's initial claim because Methanex had
not alleged "a legally significant connection" between the chal-
lenged measures and the investor.158 The Tribunal held, however,
that certain allegations Methanex advanced in its amended claim
and in its briefs and oral arguments relating to the intent behind
the California measures might satisfy that requirement, and gave
Methanex leave to file a "fresh pleading" and evidence in support
of its allegations. 159 Methanex filed an amended statement of
claim in November 2002, alleging that an "anti-foreign bias
against methanol and its products pervades the U.S. political deci-
sionmaking processes at every level" and played a substantial
part in motivating California's measures. 160
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Respondent's Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility at 15-48, Methanex
Corp. v. United States (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
158. First Partial Award 147, at 70, Methanex Corl. v. United States (Aug. 6,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 25, 2003).
159. Id. 169, at 80.
160. Second Amended Claim 280, at 118, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Nov.
5, 2002) available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 25, 2003).
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Meanwhile, Governor Davis found that it was impossible to
meet the December 2002 deadline for phasing out MTBE without
seriously disrupting the availability of gasoline in California, and
ordered that the prohibition be delayed for one year.161
California is not alone in its concern about MTBE. In March
2000, the U.S. EPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemak-
ing regarding its intent to adopt regulations to eliminate or reduce
the use of MTBE. 162 Many states have likewise taken action or
are considering proposals to restrict the use of MTBE. 163 The
Methanex complaint thus has considerable implications through-
out the United States, both by threatening many state regulations
and by threatening to expand the notion of the "property" to which
the Article 1110 obligations might apply.
2. Crompton Corp. v. Canada
In a claim quite similar to Methanex's, Crompton Corp., a Ca-
nadian subsidiary of a U.S. company, asserts that Canada's ban
on the use of lindane products to treat canola seeds violates Arti-
cles 1102, 1105, 1106 and 1110 of NAFTA. 164 Like Methanex,
Crompton claims that the ban was motivated not by scientific
proof that lindane is harmful, but by a desire to benefit the domes-
tic producers of substitute products. Crompton seeks damages of
approximately U.S. $100 million.' 65
161. Exec. Order No. D-52-02 (Cal. Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://www.gover-
nor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov-homepage.j sp.
162. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,094 (Mar. 24, 2000).
EPA has incorporated recommendations to substantially reduce MTBE use into a
draft regulatory proposal, but the proposal has not yet reached the interagency review
stage of approval and dissemination to the public, and is unlikely to do so in the near
future. Telephone Interview by Erik Bluemel with Mike Shields, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency Office of Transportation and Air Quality (June 13, 2002); see also
Control of Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), Unified Agenda, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 66 Fed. Reg. 26,148, 26,169 (May 14, 2001); U.S. EPA, ACHIEVING
CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER: THE REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OXYGEN-
ATES IN GASOLINE (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/fuels/ox-
ypanel/blueribb.htm.
163. Thus far, at least fourteen states have restricted or banned MTBE, and many
others are considering such measures. See Impact of Renewable Fuels Standard!
MTBE Provisions of S. 517.1 (2002), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/service
rpt/mtbe/pdf/sroiaf(2002)07.pdf; State MTBE Passed and/or Pending Legislation in
2000 (June 6, 2000), at http://64.49.216.152/nacs/resource/motorfuels/mtbestatelaws.
htm.
164. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, Crompton Corp. v. Canada
(Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.org/.




3. The Loewen Group v. United States
Loewen is a Canadian company, owned at least in part by
Raymond Loewen, a Canadian citizen. 166 Through an American
subsidiary, Loewen owns various funeral homes and funeral in-
surance industries. O'Keefe, a competitor, sued Loewen in a Mis-
sissippi state court alleging breach of contract, common law fraud,
and violations of Mississippi antitrust laws. 167 During the trial,
O'Keefe's attorneys repeatedly referred to Loewen's 'foreign" sta-
tus, as contrasted with O'Keefe's local roots, and sought to portray
Loewen as a racist.168 O'Keefe sought only U.S. $5 million in ac-
tual damages, 169 but the jury awarded U.S. $500 million, includ-
ing U.S. $400 million in punitive damages. 170 Loewen sought to
appeal the award, but Mississippi law requires an appeal bond of
125% of the judgment. Although the trial court had discretion to
reduce or eliminate the bond for "good cause," it refused to do so,
and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed that decision. As a
result, Loewen alleges, it was forced to settle the case for U.S.
$175 million, even though the transactions at issue were worth
less than U.S. $5 million. 171
Loewen charges that by allowing O'Keefe's counsel to make
anti-Canadian and pro-American comments, and by refusing to
reduce the bond requirement, the trial court violated Article
1102's national treatment requirement and Article 1105's mini-
mum fair treatment requirement. 172 Loewen asserts that those
actions, when combined with the excessive verdict and "coerced"
settlement, expropriated Loewen's property, in violation of Article
1110.173 It seeks U.S. $725 million in damages. 174
166. Notice of Claim 91, at 15-16, Loewen Group v. United States (Oct. 30, 1998),
available at www.naftalaw.org.
167. Id. 9 2, at 22-34.
168. Id. 4, at 35-103.
169. Id. 1 33.
170. Id. %% 3, at 104-19.
171. Id. at 1 5-6, at 120-27.
172. Notice of Claim 9191 39-61, Loewen Group. Loewen bolsters its claims with
opinions by Sir Robert Jennings, former President of the International Court of Jus-
tice; Richard Neely, former Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court; Kirk
Fordice, then-Governor of Mississippi; and Professor Andreas Lowenfeld of NYU
School of Law, all of whom opine that the jury's verdict was outrageous and was
based, or possibly based, upon nationalistic or xenophobic discrimination. Id.
173. Id. 19 7, 162-67.
174. Id. 191 183-87. The claimant in Adams v. United Mexican States also alleges
that judicial actions constitute an expropriation of property. Notice of Arbitration,
Adams v. United Mexican States (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.
org. Although only a notice of arbitration has been filed, and its presentation of facts
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The United States contested the arbitral panel's jurisdiction,
arguing that judicial acts in litigation between private parties are
not "measures" regulated by NAFTA. 175 In January 2001, the
panel rejected that argument, however, and deferred considera-
tion of other jurisdictional arguments until hearing the merits of
the controversy. 176 The hearing on the merits took place in the
fall of 2001, but in March 2002, the United States filed a new ob-
jection, arguing that Loewen had restructured itself as an Ameri-
can corporation, thereby destroying the Tribunal's jurisdiction
under NAFTA. 177 Those matters are currently under considera-
tion by the panel.
III. Federal Responses to Liability for State and Local
Regulations Found to Violate Investor Protections
As noted above, it is too early to predict whether Article 1110
will be interpreted by arbitral panels to require compensation
awards for many investor claimants. 178 The threat is sufficiently
serious, however, to justify consideration of the responses govern-
ments may have to such awards. The federal government could
respond to a panel's decision that a state or local regulation expro-
priated an investment without full, fair and adequate compensa-
tion, in violation of Article 1110, in several different ways. First,
it could attempt to force the state or locality responsible for the
regulation to repay the federal government for the cost of the
is somewhat confusing, Adams appears to involve a claim by U.S. citizens who pur-
chased lots and built vacation homes in a resort they believed belonged to the Mexi-
can government, but which Mexican courts later determined had been unlawfully
expropriated from its original owners and accordingly ordered returned to those origi-
nal owners. Id. The American investors have invoked NAFTA Articles 1102 and
1105, claiming that they were treated less favorably than Mexican investors in the
litigation over the validity of the Mexican government's expropriation of the land, and
because the Mexican courts found in favor of the original Mexican landowners rather
than the American investors. Id. They also claim that the judicial decrees ordering
that the land and improvements be returned to the original landowners expropriates
their property in violation of Article 1110. Id.
175. Notice of Arbitration, Adams v. United Mexican States (Feb. 16, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.naftalaw.org.
176. Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdic-
tion at 22, Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF/98/3) (Jan. 5,
2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.org/.
177. Respondent's Memorial on Matters of Jurisdiction and Competence Arising
from the Restructuring of the Loewen Group, Inc, Loewen Group v. United States
(Mar. 1, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8744.pdf.
178. For analysis of how the arbitral awards under Article 1110 may give interna-
tional investors "regulatory takings" protections different from those provided by the




award. It could do so either by suing the state or local government
for contribution toward the award or for indemnification for the
federal government's liability, or by seeking to recover its outlay
for the award by deducting that amount from grants or other
funds it would otherwise award to the state or locality. 179 The
United States has not yet lost a NAFTA claim, and therefore has
not been forced to face the question of how or whether to recoup
funds it expends to pay awards. After Mexico was ordered to pay
U.S. $16 million in the Metalclad dispute, however, the national
government missed the deadline to make the payment because of
disputes between the national and state governments about divid-
ing the cost of the settlement.180 The national government even-
tually paid the award, but has not ruled out the possibility that it
will seek to recoup at least part of the funds from the state and
local governments involved in the dispute. In Canada, concerns
about the national government's ability to pass the costs of
NAFTA awards through to state and local governments have led
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to request that the na-
tional government "guarantee that it will never penalize munici-
palities for actions that are valid under domestic law but violate
NAFTA ... "181
Second, if an award would require compensation in the future
to the same or other investors if the regulation were left in place,
or if the decision suggests that additional claimants will be able to
establish that similar uncompensated regulations violate
NAFTA's investor protections, the federal government could try to
avoid future liability. It could, for example, seek to force the state
or locality to change its regulations. More likely, it could tie fu-
ture federal funding to the state or locality's agreement to rescind
or modify the regulation (at least with regard to foreign investors).
179. The federal government could also pass a statute similar to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) forbidding state and local govern-
ments from discriminating against foreign investors in the expenditure of federal
funds, and defining discrimination to include any violation of NAFTA's investment
protections. That strategy would be quite cumbersome, however, because it likely
would give the federal government only the blunt tool of cutting off all future federal
funding to a state or local agency liable for a NAFTA violation. Otherwise, the strat-
egy would raise the same issues as the more finely tuned hypothetical recoupment
legislation explored in the text.
180. Anthony DePalma, NAFTA Dispute Is in Court Once Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2001, at Wl.
181. FEDERATION OF CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPAL QUESTIONS RESPECTING
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Or, the federal government could preempt the state or locality's
offending regulation by passing its own regulation and expressly
providing that the federal regulation occupies the field and
preempts regulation by states or local governments. Any of those
tacks has the potential to rearrange the way in which authority
for land use and environmental regulation is divided. The follow-
ing subsections explore the viability of each option in greater
detail.
A. Passing on the Cost of Awards
Arbitrations under NAFTA's investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism are against the signatory party-the national govern-
ment. Awards are assessed against that party. In order to pass
the cost of the award on to the state or local government responsi-
ble for the regulation, the federal government would have to be
able to sue the state or locality for contribution or indemnification,
deduct the amount of the award from federal monies that would
otherwise be granted to the state or locality, or order the state or
local government to pay the award directly to the successful
claimant.
Nothing in the legislation passed to implement NAFTA
clearly authorizes the federal government to sue a state or locality
to recover damages imposed upon the federal government for a
state or locality's violation of NAFTA, but Congress could pass
such legislation. The usual bars to suits against the states8 2
182. Suits by the United States against one of the states fall within the original
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, so there would be no jurisdictional bar to a
suit by the federal government to recover monies spent on NAFTA awards. See
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892):
The submission to judicial solution of controversies arising between these
two governments, 'each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the
other,' McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 400, 410, but both subject to
the supreme law of the land, does no violence to the inherent nature of
sovereignty. The states of the Union have agreed, in the constitution,
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases aris-
ing under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, with-
out regard to the character of the parties, (excluding, of course, suits
against a state by its own citizens or by citizens of other states, or by
citizens or subjects of foreign states,) and equally to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party, without regard to the subject of
such controversies, and that this court may exercise original jurisdiction
in all such cases 'in which a state shall be party,' without excluding those
in which the United States may be the opposite party. The exercise,
therefore, by this court, of such original jurisdiction in a suit ... brought
by the United States against a state ... so far from infringing in either
[Vol. 20
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would be unlikely to apply to such legislation.' 8 3 First, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made clear that the Eleventh Amendment's
protection of a state's sovereign immunity does not prevent the
United States from suing a state.'8 4 The Eleventh Amendment
protects a state from suit by a foreign nation,18 5 or by citizens of a
foreign nation. 8 6 One commentator has argued that the Court
would put "substance over form" to hold that an action by the
United States to recover an award resulting from a NAFTA com-
plaint filed by a foreign investor is equivalent to a suit against a
state by that foreign investor. 8 7 But form matters in Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. In holding that Congress could not
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by allowing In-
case upon the sovereignty, is with the consent of the state sued. Such
consent was given by [the State] . . . when [it was] admitted into the
Union upon an equal footing in all respects with the other states.
Id. at 646.
183. State or local governments might argue that the Due Process Clause should
prevent the federal government from imposing liability for NAFTA awards on state
and local governments, because those governments are not parties to the NAFTA ar-
bitration, and therefore may not defend themselves directly against the claim. Pre-
sumably, however, the national government could remedy that problem by inviting
the state or local government that might bear the eventual liability to participate in
the proceedings. Alternatively, due process concerns might be met by affording the
state or local government a judicial hearing regarding the validity of the arbitral
award before passing the liability for the award back to that government.
184. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) ("The Eleventh Amend-
ment in terms forbids suits against States only when 'commenced or prosecuted... by
Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' While this
has been read to bar a suit by a State's own citizen as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 10 (1890), nothing in this or any other provision of the Constitution prevents
or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United
States."). Although the issue in Mississippi was whether the United States could sue
a state to enforce the constitutional rights of citizens, in other decisions the United
States has been allowed to sue a state to settle disputes over whether the federal
government or the state owned particular land. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
at 646; see also United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890) (allowing the
United States to sue for payment on the interest of bonds issued by North Carolina
and held by the United States); United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379 (1903) (al-
lowing the United States to sue state over Michigan's sale of lands the United States
had appropriated to Michigan for the construction of a canal); United States v. Minne-
sota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) (allowing the U.S. to sue state over the proceeds from the
sale of Chippewa lands). As the Supreme Court recently noted: "States, in ratifying
the Constitution, did surrender a portion of their inherent immunity by consenting to
suits brought by sister States or by the Federal Government ." Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002).
185. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); see also Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
186. See Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329.
187. Steve Louthan, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality of NAFTA
Chapter 11, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1443, 1443-44 (2001).
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dian tribes to sue the state, for example, the Court noted in Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida'8 8 that there are "other methods of
ensuring the States' compliance with federal law: The Federal
Government can bring suit in federal court against a State ...
In Alden v. Maine, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred employees from suing a state to enforce provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, but noted that the United States could
sue on behalf of the employees:
This case at one level concerns the formal structure of federal-
ism, but in a Constitution as resilient as ours form mirrors sub-
stance. . .. The difference between a suit by the United States
on behalf of the employees and a suit by the employees impli-
cates a rule that the National Government must itself deem the
case of sufficient importance to take action against the State;
and history, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution
make clear that, under the plan of the Convention, the States
have consented to suits of the first kind but not of the second.190
Just as the United States can sue a state to enforce federal law,
even though the beneficiaries of the suit include employees who
could not themselves sue, the federal government should be able
to sue a state to recover monies the federal government has been
forced to pay because of the state's violation of NAFTA, even
though the rights ultimately at stake are those of foreign investors
who could not themselves sue the state.
Nor would the Commerce Clause bar federal legislation au-
thorizing the United States to recover damages it suffered as a
result of state or local violations of NAFTA. NAFTA and its im-
plementing legislation were designed to further investment within
the United States and trade between the states and foreign coun-
tries. Investment and trade are quintessential economic activi-
ties, both of which have a large impact on interstate commerce,
and "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sus-
188. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
189. Id. at 71 n.14; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) ("Sovereign
immunity, moreover, does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Con-
stitution and valid federal law. Rather, certain limits are implicit in the constitu-
tional principle of state sovereign immunity ... The States have consented,
moreover, to some suits pursuant to the plan of the Convention or to subsequent con-
stitutional Amendments. In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits
brought by other States or by the Federal Government." (citations omitted)).
190. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758-60.
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tained."'191 Further, allowing the federal government to pass
NAFTA awards through to the states would undoubtedly be
viewed as promoting trade by forcing the level of government re-
sponsible for interfering with free trade by violating NAFTA to
bear the costs of doing so, and thereby potentially deterring fur-
ther violations. 192
Finally, the Tenth Amendment would not bar legislation al-
lowing the federal government to sue states to recover costs it in-
curred as a result of state violations of NAFTA. The Tenth
Amendment might bar federal legislation that "commandeered"
state and local officials to pay compensation directly to private
parties for regulations found to require compensation under Chap-
ter eleven, as discussed further in subsection B.' 93 But as long as
NAFTA and its implementing legislation are authorized by either
the Commerce Clause or the Treaty Power, federal courts can re-
quire state and local governments to comply with those federal
laws under the Supremacy Clause without running afoul of the
Tenth Amendment's prohibition on the "commandeering" of state
191. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also David M. Golove, Treaty-
Making and the Nation: the Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of
the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1306 (2000) ("Given the subject matter with
which [NAFTA] deal[s], no one to my knowledge has doubted that all of the provisions
in the agreements fall within the subject matter scope of Congress's commerce pow-
ers."); see generally Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995)
(exploring the reach of the Commerce Clause after Lopez).
192. Cost-internalization is one of the major rationales for requiring governments
to compensate property owners when the government expropriates private property.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW 64 (5th ed. 1998); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance,
and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269-79 (1988); William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just
Compensation: Lessons from the Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARv. J. L.
& PUBL. POL'y 23, 30 (1996); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARv. L. REV. 997 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
859, 882-83 (1995); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings:
When Should Compensation be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 758-59 (1994); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). For judicial endorsement of
the theory see, for example, Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The cost-internalization rationale is hardly free from criticism. See Been, supra
note 5; Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). Nevertheless, it certainly
provides a rationale basis for the federal government to believe that passing the cost
of NAFTA awards back to the state or local government that caused the violation
might promote the free trade objectives of NAFTA.
193. See text accompanying notes infra 199-213.
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legislative or administrative processes. 19 4 If the implementing
legislation authorized the federal government to recover from
states195 the damages it incurred when a state violated Chapter
11, federal courts imposing that remedy for state violations would
seem no different from federal courts ordering states to pay dam-
ages to the United States under such federal laws as CERCLA. 196
B. Seeking to Prevent State and Local Regulations that May
Violate Chapter 11
The federal government might prefer to try to prevent state
and local governments from violating NAFTA ex ante, rather than
resting on its right to recover its damages ex post for a state's or
locality's violations. Suing a state to recover damages might be
more visible and politically controversial than seeking to influence
state regulation.' 9 7 Further, the cost of an arbitral award against
a nation includes not just the actual amount of the award, and the
national government's expenses in defending against the claim,
but also the public relations costs to the national government as it
attempts to exert leverage on other countries to treat its investors
in those countries well, and to the country as a whole if the judg-
ment dissuades foreign investment. Those "indirect" costs are un-
likely to be easily quantified, and are likely to be hard to recover
194. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
195. Presumably, the implementing legislation also could authorize the federal
government to seek a court order allowing the United States to deduct from federal
funds it would otherwise pay to the state any damages the United States had suffered
as a result of the state's violation of NAFTA.
196. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607 (2000); see generally Steven G. Davison, Governmental
Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 47, 83 (1997).
197. The extent to which the states are able to protect their interests in Congress is
the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Vicki C. Jackson, Federal-
ism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180
(1998); see also Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas:
The Early Experience Under NAFTA and the Challenge of Hemispheric Integration, 19
Hous. J. INT'L. L. 615, 638-39 n.107 (1997) (arguing that the states have become
aware of the threat that international law poses to their regulatory programs and
have "negotiated an arrangement with the federal government to incorporate state
viewpoints and interests both in the legislative process (to determine if states' inter-
ests will be compromised by action at the international level), and in the [NAFTA]
dispute settlement process (to the extent state laws are involved in a dispute)."). But
surely the states have sufficient power to make any move by the federal government
to recoup NAFTA awards controversial, especially given the public debates that al-




from the state or local government responsible for the violation.
Finally, the "cost-internalization" achieved by asking state or local
governments to pay a takings judgment may be incomplete, 198 so
the federal government may prefer to exert direct pressure on reg-
ulatory decisions in order to supplement the deterrent value of po-
tential liability.
The federal government cannot directly compel state or local
governments to regulate in a manner that minimizes the threat of
NAFTA complaints because New York v. United States'99 makes it
clear that Congress cannot "use the States as implements of regu-
lation," or "require the States to govern according to Congress' in-
structions."200 Congress could, however, "encourage" the states to
regulate in a way that minimizes the risk of NAFTA violations.
New York identified several "methods, short of outright coercion,
by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative pro-
gram consistent with federal interests."20
Congress could, for example, attach conditions to a state's re-
ceipt of federal funds that would encourage states to avoid regula-
tions that might violate NAFTA. 20 2 There are four basic
limitations on conditions on the spending power. First, they must
be "in pursuit of 'the general welfare."' 20 3 Second, the conditions
must be "unambiguously" stated.20 4 These two requirements
should not be difficult to meet. Courts grant considerable defer-
ence to Congress' judgment about what will promote the general
welfare, 20 5 and encouraging free trade and foreign investment and
avoiding violations of international agreements easily would sat-
isfy the test. Congress certainly is capable of making the condi-
tions clear. Third, the condition imposed upon federal funds may
not violate any independent constitutional bar-that is, spending
may not be conditioned, for example, on a state's agreement to
take some action that would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Although it is possible that conditioning receipt of federal funds
198. See supra text accompanying note 192.
199. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
200. Id. at 162.
201. Id. at 166.
202. Congress could use similar conditional spending techniques to encourage
states to agree to pay any damages the federal government incurs as a result of
NAFTA awards, if it did not want to rely on suits for contribution or indemnification.
203. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
204. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981)).
205. Id. at 207 n.2; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976).
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on agreements to avoid NAFTA violations might run afoul of other
constitutional guarantees, the federal government could structure
the conditions to avoid those problems.20 6
The fourth requirement is the most challenging: conditions
must relate to the "federal interest;" in particular, national
projects or programs. 20 7 The Court has not specified the degree of
relatedness required.208 In South Dakota v. Dole,20 9 the Court up-
held a statute conditioning states' receipt of federal highway funds
on the adoption of a uniform drinking age, finding the relationship
between the condition and the highway project sufficient because
in states with low drinking ages, young people may drive drunk on
federal highways. 210 Similarly, to satisfy the relatedness require-
ment, the federal government could condition the receipt of, for
example, funds to the state's environmental protection agencies
upon the state's agreement to refrain from enacting environmen-
tal regulations that would violate NAFTA, asserting that NAFTA
violations would jeopardize the federal government's ability to
fund state's environmental programs, and would create contro-
versy over environmental regulations that would undermine the
federal government's funding program. Here, as with the condi-
tional spending upheld in New York, the Court would likely find
that "both the conditions and the payments embody Congress' ef-
206. The federal government could not condition the receipt of federal funds, for
example, upon a state's agreement to give foreign investors better treatment than
domestic ones, because doing so presumably would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Nor could a condition require the states to promote free trade even where
doing so would result in a taking of the property rights of domestic property owners.
207. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461 (1978)).
208. Since Dole was decided in 1987, the Court has shown considerable interest in
examining the connection between conditions that local governments place on land-
use permissions (exactions) and the "projected impact of the proposed development."
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, (1987). Determining whether such exactions are proportional and congru-
ent to the problems they seek to address is analogous to the relatedness inquiry Dole
mandates. Both the exaction analysis and the conditional spending analysis search
for a nexus between the condition the government imposes and the purpose of its
spending or regulatory program. Dole allows Congress much greater leeway on the
nexus than Nollan or Dolan permitted state and local governments. Nollan and Do-
lan might be driven by the Court's distrust of state and local governments' land use
powers, however, and therefore not be deemed relevant to federal conditional
spending.





forts to address the pressing problem" of how to achieve environ-
mental protection in a cost-effective manner.211
The second method Congress could use to "encourage" states
and localities to avoid regulations that would trigger NAFTA's
compensation requirements would be conditional preemption.
Congress may "offer States the choice of regulating [an] activity
according to federal standards or having state law preempted by
federal regulation."212 Congress undoubtedly has the power to
regulate much that is now left to state and local environmental
regulators, and even much that is now within the province of state
and local land use agencies, because of the impact both environ-
mental and land use decisions have on interstate commerce. 213
Although political, fiscal, and practical constraints limit Congress'
credibility in threatening to preempt much state and local envi-
ronmental and land use regulation, 21 4 the threat often will never-
theless be sufficiently serious to encourage state and local
governments to acquiesce in the federal regulatory scheme rather
than risk losing all control over the field.
IV. Potential Implications of Investor Protection Provisions for
the Allocation of Authority for Land Use and
Environmental Regulation
Even after the Court's recent federalism decisions, therefore,
the federal government retains considerable power to either pass
back to state and local governments the cost of any awards for
Chapter 11 violations, or to seek to influence states and localities
to tailor their regulations to avoid triggering Chapter 11 com-
plaints. That power has several significant implications for the
211. New York, 505 U.S. at 172; see generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1954-88 (1995).
212. New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
213. But cf. Solid Waste Agency v. Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (hold-
ing that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) rule extending definition of "navigable
waters" under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to include intrastate waters used as
habitat by migratory birds exceeded authority granted to the Corps under the CWA,
in part to avoid the difficult constitutional question of whether regulation of such
intrastate waters "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional
and primary power over land and water use ... ").
214. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 425-26 (1998); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 868 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1332-36 (1999).
2002]
39
58 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
allocation of authority between state and federal regulators, state
and local regulators, and land use and environmental regulators.
To the extent that passing the costs of Chapter 11 awards
back, or encouraging state and local regulators to avoid triggering
Chapter 11 complaints, results in more cautious state and local
regulation,2 15 NAFTA may allow the federal government to effec-
tively decrease state and local governments' traditional control
over land use and the environment. If Congress were to pass leg-
islation requiring state and local governments to compensate do-
mestic property owners for any land use or environmental
regulation that reduced the value of property (or reduced its value
by some specified percentage), surely state and local governments
would protest that the compensation requirement was a back-door
attempt to severely limit their ability to regulate.216 NAFTA's
Chapter 11 does essentially the same thing by imposing compen-
sation requirements that may be interpreted by arbitral panels to
be more demanding than the U.S. Constitution. Both the hypo-
thetical domestic property rights protection and Chapter l1's for-
eign investor protections could reduce state and local regulation of
the environment and land use considerably. They would not nec-
essarily increase federal regulation, because the federal govern-
ment too might prefer to minimize its potential liability by
avoiding regulation altogether. But by applying NAFTA to states
and localities in the ways outlined in Section III, the federal gov-
ernment could substantially reduce the willingness and ability of
state and local governments to regulate environmental and land
use affairs. Similarly, because so much of the environmental reg-
ulation (and some land use regulation) in the United States is
based upon a system of cooperative federalism, state governments
are likely to assert federal mandates (rather than state law) as the
basis for their refusal to permit development, in an attempt to
minimize their risk of liability for NAFTA violations.
Chapter l1's investor protections also could shift the exercise
of regulatory authority from local to state regulators. Generally
speaking, local governments are less able than state governments
215. Cf. Levinson, supra note 192 (exploring reasons to doubt that the cost-inter-
nalization model works very well as applied to government regulators).
216. It is noteworthy that the several bills introduced in Congress in the last dec-
ade to strengthen property rights imposed stricter takings protections only on federal
regulators or state regulators implementing federal statutes. See, e.g., Private Prop-




to bear the cost of the pass-through of a NAFTA award, 217 or to
bear the cost of defending against a NAFTA complaint (although
the federal government is the party defending against an inves-
tor's complaint, the federal government's defense would inevitably
impose costs upon the local officials involved in the regulation,
and upon local counsel). Local governments therefore would be
more likely than states to settle any investor complaints that
arose, and more cautious in regulating when developers threaten
Chapter 11 complaints. That caution will affect both the strength
of local government's regulatory programs, and the willingness of
local governments to assume or retain regulatory authority over a
problem. It also may result in strategic positioning-local govern-
ments might respond to the threat of liability by attempting to
place their permitting processes last in the sequence of reviews,
such that the state's regulators would bear the initial responsibil-
ity for limiting environmental damage, and therefore bear the ini-
tial brunt of the threat of liability. Just as states might seek to
insulate themselves by invoking federal mandates as the basis for
permit denials, local governments may act strategically in citing
state and federal mandates as requiring them to deny develop-
ment rights.
Finally, investor protections may shift regulation away from
land use regulators and toward environmental agencies. Because
of the national and most-favored-nation treatment requirements,
individual permitting decisions will be more susceptible to inves-
tor complaints than broader-brushed regulatory programs. The
ad-hoc, highly discretionary nature of much of land use decision-
making will leave planning and zoning agencies particularly vul-
nerable to claims of prejudice. A move from flexible, discretionary
systems to more comprehensive command and control schemes
may push the already eroding borders between land use and envi-
ronmental law further toward environmental regulation.
Each of these potential implications-towards greater centrali-
zation and less localism, and towards more comprehensive and
less discretionary regulatory regimes-carries both risks and bene-
fits. There is enormous controversy about the benefits of more de-
centralized regimes, and about the tradeoff between flexibility and
comprehensiveness. The implications of NAFTA's investor protec-
217. Local governments may also be less able to insure against liability for Chapter
11 violations than state governments, because of their smaller size and budget, and
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tion provisions upon the distribution of authority between the fed-
eral, state and local governments and between environmental and
land use regulatory schemes therefore are not necessarily unde-
sirable. The implications need to be considered, and debated,
however, in any assessment of the desirability of bilateral or mul-
tilateral investor protection agreements.
V. Looking Ahead to Future Investment and Trade
Agreements
Article l's investor protections have been the source of con-
siderable controversy over the past year. The expropriation provi-
sions of Article 11 were the subject of debate during Congressional
consideration of the Trade Promotion Authority Act,218 which pro-
vides the president with "fast track" authority to negotiate new
trade agreements. 219 Debates over proposed trade agreements
such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas have, and undoubt-
edly will continue to, focus on how investor protection provisions
should be refined in light of the experience thus far with
NAFTA. 220
This Article has sought to emphasize that discussions about
revisions of the NAFTA investor protection provisions must focus
not only on clarifying the definition of expropriation, but also on
how any compensation requirement (even one supposedly congru-
ent with U.S. takings law) contained in a trade agreement may
affect the allocation of power between federal, state, and local land
use and environmental authorities. In negotiations over future
trade or investment agreements, the U.S. negotiating team should
address, for example, whether awards under the agreement will
be paid by the federal government, without contribution, indemni-
fication, or set-off from state and local governments involved in
the dispute. The right of state and local governments to partici-
pate in the investor state dispute proceedings should be clarified.
218. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Trade Bill, Restoring Broad Presidential
Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A5 (discussing enactment of trade promotion
legislation).
219. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S4267 (daily ed. May 13, 2002) (discussing the
Baucus amendment to the Trade Promotion Authority Act); 148 CONG. REC. S4503
(daily ed. May-16, 2002) (discussing the failed Kerry Amendment to the Act).
220. See, e.g., Agencies Mull Regulatory Takings Standards in Investment Dis-
putes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 20, 2002, at 1, 27; Administration Proposes Higher
Thresholds for Investor Suits, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 27, 2002, at 1, 18. Foreign
Investment: Investment Chapters in Future Trade Accords to Differ From NAFTA,




The relationship between the dispute resolution process and pro-
tections normally accorded to state and local decision-makers in
litigation, such as Eleventh Amendment immunity and the final-
ity and exhaustion requirements imposed upon takings claim-
ants, 221 also should be thought through. In short, clarifying
investor protection provisions is not just a matter of tinkering
with the definition of expropriation. Considerable thought must
be given to the implications investment and trade agreements
have more generally for the levels of government who bear pri-
mary decision-making and financial responsibility roles for envi-
ronmental and land use regulation.
221. See Williamson Co. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
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